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Through a juxtaposition of diaspora policy with migrants’ transnational citizenship practices, this article
explores how peoplehood, nationhood and citizenship are articulated, justified and enacted. The article
draws on the politico-spatial context of Norwegian-Pakistani transnational social space, analyzing the
Pakistani Origin Card (POC), remittances and return mobilities as transnational citizenship practices.
The elusiveness of residency becomes apparent, underscoring the salience of territoriality, for both dias-
pora strategies and transnational citizenship practices, involving the co-constitution of formal member-
ship and everyday citizenship practices. Through this overlaps, frictions and disruptions in conceptions of
citizenship and of nationhood are revealed, underscoring their non-static nature. Whilst questions of who
is included within the people are more commonly approached from the vantage point of immigration
contexts, they share key tenets of struggles over conceptualizations of citizenship, and more plural ide-
ologies of nationhood, in emigration contexts, exposed by a juxtaposition of diaspora policies and
migrants’ transnational citizenship practices.
 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Through a juxtaposition of diaspora policy with migrants’
transnational citizenship practices, this article hones in on the
ways in which peoplehood,1 nationhood and citizenship are articu-
lated, justified and enacted (Brubaker, 2010; Collyer, 2013;
Yamashiro, 2015). It does so by drawing on the case of the Pakistani
state’s diaspora engagement initiatives and broadly, the ways in
which Norwegian-Pakistani migrants’ relate to these. Through this,
it sheds theoretical light on questions of who a state relates to – in
this case with reference to whom the emigration state relates to in
its diaspora engagement efforts; which people the state relates to,
is a question that lies at the core of the citizenship concept. Through
the coupling of the nation with the state in modern nation-states,
the question also underpins ideologies of nationhood (Mügge,
2013), drawing boundaries of membership of the people (Bauder,2013a). However, competing stories of nationhood and national
community may run parallel, as different national imaginaries are
observable both in diaspora strategies and in migrants’ ways of relat-
ing to these, through their everyday, lived, transnational citizenship
practices (Ho et al., 2015a: 209–210; Dzenovska, 2013; Ho, 2011).
Processes and practices of deterritorialization and reterritorial-
ization are often intertwined (Raj, 2015). Whilst eroding some of
the state’s powers, they are resulting in the increasing salience
for states of institutions, such as (formal) citizenship, including
the power to control borders and to issue passports (Martin and
Paasi, 2016). Meanwhile, through the mobility of people, the
clear-cut connection between the people, the territory and the
state, becomes more complicated (Joppke, 1999; Brubaker, 2010;
Raj, 2015). This also means that the spatialities of legal aspects of
citizenship become increasingly complicated (Martin and Paasi,
2016; Staeheli, forthcoming). The focus of this paper is on
migrants’ transnational citizenship practices and specifically on
the juxtaposition of these, with the Pakistani state’s enactment of
variants of (transnational) citizenship, from an emigration state
vantage point, as part of their diaspora engagement initiatives.
Much attention has been devoted to the implications of immi-
gration (typically intoWestern Europe) on the formation of citizen-
ship (Brubaker, 2010; Joppke, 1999, 2010). Particular focus has
fallen on the challenges of upholding the legitimacy of equal citi-
zenship in diverse societies, foregrounding citizenship both as a
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community of the nation-state, at least), where practices and lived
experience constitute key dimensions (Staeheli et al., 2012). Mean-
while, intersections of nationhood construction and citizenship in
emigration contexts have focused in particular on extra-
territorial voting and on emigration state’s diaspora strategies
(Collyer, 2013, 2014; Gamlen, 2008; Mügge, 2013; Ragazzi,
2014). The primary focus has thus been on the formal citizenship
status, rather than on citizenship as a signifier of membership (in
the political community of the nation-state), where citizenship
practices and lived experiences play a salient role. However, geog-
raphers (and others) researching migrant transnationalism have
foregrounded the mutual interconnectedness of citizenship as for-
mal status, and as lived, practiced and experienced membership,
both in emigration and immigration contexts, thus opening up
for a multiplicity of scales of citizenship, including the local,
national and transnational (Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2006; Spinney
et al., 2015). More recently, a special issue of this journal (Ho
et al., 2015b), elaborated the multiplicity of actors targeted by dias-
pora strategies and, in so doing, underscored the need to acknowl-
edge migrant subjectivities, revealing of the practiced and lived
dimensions of transnational citizenship. Similarly, the term
‘transnational lived citizenship’ has been advocated in order to
foreground lived space and situated practice as inherent to citizen-
ship (Kallio and Mitchell, 2016; Martin and Paasi, 2016). The term
also emphasizes ‘not explicitly acting as citizens’ as part of the
potential for repoliticizing and respatializing citizenship (Kallio
and Mitchell, 2016: 261). Such an approach, however, need not
entail a denationalization of citizenship nor the obscuring the role
of (nation-)states, but rather entail centering analysis on situated
practices (Martin and Paasi, 2016; Raj, 2015). In order to bring geo-
graphical perspectives to the forefront, it is necessary to focus on
‘particular political-spatial contexts, exploring engagements and
activities of different people and institutions which shape these
entities and disclose the citizenships that these worlds afford and
practice’ (Kallio and Mitchell, 2016: 263–264). This can be
achieved through exploring ‘where and how people lead their lives
as political subjects, and what governs and guides these lives and
subjectivities’ (Kallio and Mitchell, 2016: 264).
This article contributes to these bodies of work, foregrounding
the practiced and experienced dimensions of citizenship, of
transnational lived citizenship, and how these are mutually consti-
tutive of notions of membership of the nation, the citizenry or the
people, which are also articulated, justified and enacted by the Pak-
istani state, through their diaspora engagement strategies. The
article thus combines a focus on individual and collective
bottom-up iterations of citizenship, through acts of citizenship,
acknowledging that transnational subjects negotiate ‘the many cit-
izenships that frame their lives’ (Staeheli, 2011: 399), with the
observed reality, that there are governance dimensions, where
the state’s role is highly relevant to include. These are spheres
where the state holds power, such as granting citizenship, but also
national identity cards (such as the NICOP and POC) or with
regards to managing mobility and settlement (such as in relation
to return mobilities), but also spheres where the state holds less
power, in terms of financial and economic matters (such as
remittances).
Through the analyses of situated practices and acts of citizen-
ship, where individuals may ‘not explicitly act as citizens’ (Kallio
and Mitchell, 2016: 261), the relevance and (non-)roles of the state
come to the fore. This perspective contributes to unpacking the
‘‘who” of diaspora strategies, which conversely is a useful lens on
more far-reaching questions about nationhood ideologies, concep-
tualizations of citizenship, and constructions of shared collective
identities of peoplehood in the contemporary world. Adopting an
approach that acknowledges the multiplicity of scales whichtransnational lived citizenship entails, the article remains open to
the possibility of the renationalization of conceptions of citizenship
and peoplehood, with potentially differing roles for states.
In the geographic literature on (transnational) citizenship, less
attention has so far been paid to the striking similarities in the
effect of migration on the premises for conceptualizations of citi-
zenship in both contexts of emigration and immigration. As the
population inhabiting nation-state territories increasingly move
in and out over time, they may have simultaneous formal or
experienced membership status and ties with one or more other
nation-states (see also Smith and McQuarrie, 2011). The migrant
transnationalism literature foregrounds how, for individual
migrants and for migrant communities, citizenship relationships
with both emigration and immigration states are often parallel
(Erdal and Oeppen, 2013; Snel et al., 2006; Carling and Pettersen,
2014), of which the increased prevalence of dual citizenship
regimes is also reflective (Faist, 2012).
For each state, however, citizenship remains to a certain extent
singular, relating to its own citizenry, and tending to ignore the
ways in which dual or multiple citizenships effectively have impli-
cations for the frames within which both conceptions of citizen-
ship and ideologies of nationhood may develop. Given the
prevalence of dual citizenship, in practice more and more nation-
states formally acknowledge double or multiple citizenship ties –
as formal status and to some extent as memberships and practiced
realities. Thus, nationhood ideologies that seek to remain consis-
tent with the notion of peoplehood, which the state enacts through
citizenship policies, need to encompass a more plural story
(Antonsich and Mavroudi, 2014). This is a story allowing for the
multiplicity of citizenships, for non-singular national belonging,
and for more flexibility in types of residency within the nation-
state’s territorial boundaries.
Rainer Bauböck discusses ‘citizenship constellations’, which
refer to the formal, quasi-formal and informal ways individuals
may be simultaneously linked to multiple political entities (2010,
p. 848). In moving this up to the collective level of the people or
the nation, with reference to the people as a whole, conceptualiza-
tions of both citizenship and nationhood need to be approached
with flexibility and with pragmatism (Ong, 1999; Mavroudi,
2008). The somewhat atypical case of how a state relates to its
diaspora population and how the diaspora may relate back, pro-
vides a useful lens through which to explore these contemporary
processes of re-conceptualizing citizenship and nationhood ideolo-
gies. Here, the category of membership in the nation(-state) as sin-
gular and connected with citizenship and residency, due to
mobility and sustained transnational ties is challenged and re-
constituted, opening for more plural conceptualizations, which
are inclusive of lived experiences and migrants’ transnational citi-
zenship(s) as these may be practiced.
It is migrants’ transnational practices that diaspora policies seek
to affect, thus migrants’ transnational engagements can be under-
stood as responses to state diaspora policies (Boccagni, 2014).
However, it should be acknowledged that most migrant practices
are undertaken largely independently of the state’s efforts to shape
them. Nonetheless, the point for the purposes of this article is that
the ways in which the state defines the set of people whose actions
are sought affected through diaspora engagement strategies, is
revealing of changing, highly pragmatic and flexible, approaches
to conceptualizing citizenship and navigating ideologies of nation-
hood. These approaches are also revealing of the continued sal-
ience of the national and of the state, as an imagined community
and institutionally, in co-constituting contemporary transnational
lived citizenship(s).
Citizenship is always based on particular territorial assump-
tions, associated with birthplace (jus soli), ethnic homeland (jus
sanguinis) or place of dwelling (jus domicile) (Bauder, 2013a). These
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(Brubaker, 1990, 2010); i.e., the ways in which decisions about
who belongs to the nation become ideologically justified. As
Brubaker (1990) observes, parallels exist between the ideal types
of citizenship – where nationalisms are traditionally discussed in
a more demos-oriented civic form – and a more ethnos-oriented
form of nationalism. In other words, all these are ideal types are
increasingly accepted. Furthermore, as Bauder (2013b, p. 56)
argues: ‘Although, nationhood, as a marker of identity, and citizen-
ship, as membership in a state, could conceptually be separated,
the two concepts are historically closely connected and were fused
in the development of the modern nation-state.’ Moreover, nation-
alism, nations and nationhood are constantly negotiated and rene-
gotiated; and often the domicile ideal type of citizenship is taken on
board for populations living within state boundaries (see e.g. Koch,
2015), resulting in further interconnections. Granted the negoti-
ated and processual nature of both nationhood and citizenship,
and their interconnections, their relational co-constitution over
time, in particular politico-spatial contexts, needs to be
acknowledged.
Different conceptions of citizenship and ideologies of nation-
hood affect the development of diaspora strategies and migrants’
responses to them. Different conceptions lead to differing expan-
sions and limitations for the targeted group – that is, the
diaspora-cum-citizenry-cum nation (Boccagni, 2014). The ideolog-
ical underpinnings of who is as part of the diaspora effectively
reflect definitions of nationhood, in relation to who is or is not
included, and whether or not nationhood is conceived of as some-
thing negotiable.
The case of Pakistani diaspora policies and Norwegian-Pakistani
responses was selected due to specific salient characteristics. Nei-
ther Pakistan nor Norway permits dual citizenship universally.
While Pakistan permits dual citizenship with 16 countries, Norway
permits dual citizenship only as an exception to an otherwise abso-
lute single-citizenship rule (Brochmann and Seland, 2010). In this
context, migrants’ transnational citizenship practices are opera-
tionalized in relation to three dimensions: quasi-citizenship in
the form of the Pakistani Origin Card (POC), remittances and return
mobilities (see also Raj, 2015 on the Indian case). All three forms
give rise to conceptual and normative debates about membership,
territory and citizenship within modern nation-states.
The next section, on methods and data, sets the stage for a dis-
cussion of people beyond residency providing a conceptual back-
drop for the analysis, which is followed by a description of the
empirical findings of Pakistani diaspora policies and Norwegian-
Pakistani migrants. This is followed by the analysis, which juxta-
poses diaspora policies and migrants’ transnational citizenship
practices relating to the POC, remittances and return mobilities.
The conclusion emphasizes the broader theoretical implications
of arguments beyond the Pakistani case, relevant for the related
but not always mutually cross-feeding fields of geographic inquiry
on diaspora policies, migrant transnationalism and citizenship.2 Possibilities and realities of return migration (www.prio.org/premig), and remit-
tances from immigrants in Norway.
3 The closest to dual citizenship Norwegian-Pakistanis get, due to single citizenship
policy legislation in Norway.2. Methods and data
This article draws on a combination of qualitative data from
fieldwork conducted in Norway and Pakistan, from 2008 to 2014
and a desk-based study. The desk-based study, which focuses on
Pakistani diaspora engagement policies, was informed by interac-
tions that I had with Pakistani migrants and civil servants in Pak-
istan and abroad from 2012 to 2014. The qualitative data consist
of 80 semi-structured interviews and five focus groups. They com-
prise 45 Pakistani migrants and their descendants in the larger
Oslo area; 35 Norwegian-Pakistanis who were on visits to Pakistani
Punjab or residing there over longer periods of time as returnmigrants; and 25 non-migrants in Pakistani Punjab, who partici-
pated in the focus groups. The data was collected as part of two
research projects2 and my own research engagement with this
transnational social field extending beyond the projects.
Research participants were recruited using gatekeepers in Nor-
way and Pakistan. The aim was to engage a range of men and
women from diverse backgrounds and with differing education
levels, socioeconomic positions and migration histories. The group
of research participants in Norway reflects the broader demo-
graphic and socioeconomic composition of the Norwegian-
Pakistani population. Significant trends here include an older
migrant generation and a mixed younger generation comprising
migrants and descendants. Research participants in Pakistan were
recruited on the premise that they had lived in Pakistan for over a
year, although the category of ‘return migrants’ was rather elusive
– often, families were leading transnational lives effectively based
in more than one country (Erdal et al., 2015). Or, some research
participants in Pakistan were included as ‘visitors’ living perma-
nently in Norway; their responses yielded other perspectives,
being notably affected by the interviews’ location, Pakistan.
3. Conceptualizing peoplehood beyond residency
Picking up on the research agenda set out by Ho (2011) and Ho
et al. (2015b), foregrounding migrant subjectivities and the multi-
plicity of actors targeted by diaspora engagement policies, this sec-
tion hones in on the possibility of conceptualizing peoplehood
beyond residency, whilst acknowledging the back-drop of the
world as largely organized in (nation-)state entities. Arguably, a
step aside from the focus on citizenship and nationhood, per se,
enables a closer look at the ways in which spatialities of transna-
tional lived citizenship play out. The role of residency is a case in
point and its connections with territory may be conceived of col-
lectively not only through the prism of the (nation-)state, but also
of the people, where shared collective fate territorially, may be
seen differently among actors, people and institutions.
Which ideologies of nationhood dominate has important impli-
cations for membership and understandings of who is presumably
targeted by diaspora policies, as part of the nation or the people
(Mügge, 2013, p. 353). For instance, Brand (2014, p. 9) finds that
contemporary developments in extraterritorial voting reveal a
‘process of redefining the boundaries of the nation and of the
meaning of citizenship’. The article’s focus on citizenship as both
formal status and practices, is reflected in the analysis, where there
is first a discussion of the Pakistani Origin Card,3 second a discus-
sion of remittance sending – a key focus of Pakistani diaspora
engagement initiatives, foregrounding economic and practiced
dimensions of citizenship as lived membership in particular commu-
nities within the nation-state, and third, on return mobilities, prac-
tices central to migrant transnationalism, and ones which in
particular ways challenge territorialized connections between citi-
zenship and residency.
As a result of the ways in which spatialities of the legal aspects
of citizenship are increasingly complicated (Martin and Paasi,
2016; Staeheli, forthcoming), the power dynamics of state-
citizenry relationships are challenged. Emigrants who are natural-
ized abroad and hold dual citizenship do not wind up on the
receiving end of policies that they themselves may vote for (Ho
et al., 2015b). The state also has only so much power to exert
beyond territorial borders on its non-resident citizens and others
positioned to affect policy from the diaspora (Ho, 2011). As such,
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ist logic, but active agents in the social construction of the practices
of transnational citizenship’ (Smith, 2003, p. 499), which an analy-
sis foregrounding these as situated within particular politico-
spatial contexts showcases. Arguably, in this context the category
of residency is both becoming more problematic and more salient.
On the one hand migrants’ may have voting rights enabling poli-
cies they will never experience the effects of directly, and on the
other hand, the legitimacy and shared understanding of the notion
of ‘peoplehood’ may become increasingly questioned along the
lines of physical presence. Residence, as a signifier of membership
within a community of shared fate bounded territorially, rather
than in more abstract nationhood terms may be seen differently
from the perspectives of non-migrant populations, migrants and
the state.
In this article I question the nature of membership in nation-
states vis-à-vis emigrated populations. To make sense of this, I
argue that the categories of residency and citizenship – and how
they do or do not overlap – provide an avenue into the spatialities
of citizenship. Residence, whilst much as formal citizenship is a
legal category, is also a category where there are degrees and pro-
cesses involved, opening up both for multiplicity, and for complex
spatialities. These categories then are seen as discursive, and may
have particular implications or be flexibly and interchangeably
used.
Here the notion of ‘flexible citizenship’ is relevant (Ong, 1999);
there is evidence that both state and migrants support flexibiliza-
tion. Furthermore, both states and migrants it seems, approach
citizenship relatively pragmatically. ‘Pragmatic citizenship’ as
discussed by Mavroudi (2008) for Palestinians in Greece, invokes
migrants – stateless or otherwise – for whom citizenship choices
are pragmatic. Here a distancing from the traditional linking of
citizenship, state and nation appears necessary (Mavroudi,
2008). However, it could also be said that these processes are tied
to a renationalization of citizenship (Bosniak, 2011), as both
nationhood and citizenship are negotiated conceptions. So,
pragmatic citizenship need not refer to a decoupling of
citizenship from identity or belonging, but rather to flexibilization
and a degree of pragmatism. In short, it is accepting a multiplicity
of loyalties, including those pertaining to citizenship’s formal
status(es) (Bauböck, 2010).
The people to whom the state relates cannot be neatly catego-
rized according to residency or citizenship. Still, categorical dis-
tinctions can help conceptualize the relationships between
citizenship, territory and membership, which simultaneously open
up for notions of peoplehood where the state perhaps is less cen-
tral, or of nationhood with other spatialities than those suggested
by residency. Fig. 1 illustrates formal citizenship status and resi-
dency as aspects of these relationships. The four categories, which
I see as changeable and flexible, are ways of conceptualizing mem-
bership vis-à-vis state diaspora strategies, in particular with
regards to the question of how the state approaches the question
of who it is that is targeted by diaspora engagement strategies.
The four categories shed light on citizenship, beyond its formal
institution, and on the role of territory in relation to citizenship
and membership of a nation or the people. Revealed thus are the
practical implications of inclusion and exclusion, of particular ide-
ologies of nationhood, along with ways of constructing citizenship
(Bauder, 2013a, 2013b).
First, resident citizens comprise the majority of the population.
Some may be return migrants with dual citizenship, while others
may be of immigrant descent. Second, non-resident citizens consti-
tute parts of the diaspora. They may be only citizens of the emigra-
tion state or dual citizens and, either way, may temporarily visit or
stay in the emigration state. Third, resident non-citizens are usually
immigrants staying for a while or permanently. They includedescendants of immigrants, but also a different category, return
migrants and their descendants. Some of them will only hold the
citizenship of their former country of immigration. Fourth, non-
resident non-citizens, would in principle mean any non-citizen, liv-
ing anywhere outside the state’s boundaries. Those individuals
who are relevant for the discussion in this article, however, are
usually diaspora members who have renounced their original
(emigration state) citizenship and taken up the citizenship of their
country of immigration. They comprise former citizens, who would
usually also be former residents, and their descendants (not former
residents, usually).
These categories are discursive, though they are also categories
of practice with which states differentiate between non-resident
citizens and previously non-resident citizens (who have since
become non-resident non-citizens). The classification underscores
how the territoriality of citizenship stays intact as a dimension of
state power, which cannot be ignored (Bauder, 2013a; Staeheli
et al., 2012). States approach their different diaspora policy targets
differently. Sometimes the focus is on non-resident citizens, as
reflected in the term extraterritorial citizens, though categories
beyond that of formal citizens are often included.
A pattern emerges: the greater the flexibility surrounding citi-
zenship and residency (e.g. dual citizenship arrangements), the
greater the overlap and the fluidity between these categories over
time and over individuals’ life courses. This could potentially pro-
duce new ways of thinking about citizenship, territory and mem-
bership in nation-states. Although the territoriality of citizenship
still prevails (Bauder, 2013a), it is necessary to incorporate prag-
matic, flexible approaches to citizenship and nationhood when
conceptualizing mobility and mobile people’s places within con-
temporary political communities, whether described in terms of
peoplehood, nationhood or citizenship.
How emigration states define the pool of people they embrace
(Gamlen, 2014), or target with a diaspora policy provides one, per-
haps a-typical, lens for understanding new conceptions of collec-
tive identities of peoplehood and nationhood. Notably this lens
also permits exploring how those targeted as diasporas seek to
relate to and respond to such embracing. The spatialities of citizen-
ship and residency both become more complicated and remain
salient for negotiations about membership. As the subsequent
analyses sections discuss, migrants’ transnational citizenship prac-
tices are revealing not only of the interconnections of citizenship
and nationhood, residency and membership, but also of the poten-
tial for de-coupling the state from (its central role) in narratives of
peoplehood.4. Pakistani diaspora engagement policies and Norwegian-
Pakistani migrants’ responses
As a consequence of postcolonial partition, India and Pakistan
was created – with the Pakistani state established in 1947, exhibit-
ing Muslim nationalist proclivities (Ayres, 2009; Navqi, 2012).
Since then, Pakistani ideologies of nationhood and conceptions of
citizenship have incorporated religious dimensions, on the one
hand, and sought to manage Pakistan’s plural society, on the other
(Iqtidar, 2012; Lall, 2012). The state is strongly invested in manag-
ing notions of peoplehood and nationalism, which are also articu-
lated in its citizenship policy (Iqtidar, 2012). However, Pakistan’s
ability to provide for its citizens is challenged, on many counts,
as reflected by the population’s high degree of pragmatism and dis-
trust. Meanwhile, this alienation from the state coexists, paradox-
ically, with a strong sense of belonging to the nation (Lall, 2012).
From its inception, the Pakistani state has dealt with migration.
It witnessed substantial population movements between India and
Pakistan during partition and later, with substantial Afghan
RESIDENT NON-RESIDENT
CITIZENS A: Resident citizens B: Non-resident citizens
NON-CITIZENS C: Resident non-citizens D: Non-resident non-citizens
Fig. 1. Citizenship, residency and nationhood.
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Bureaucratically, efforts by the Pakistani government concerning
emigrants are characterized by numerous initiatives and organiza-
tions, often targeting labor migrants in the Gulf. The Ministry of
Overseas Pakistanis, established as its own ministry in 2008, is in
charge of diaspora affairs. In 2013, its name became the Ministry
of Overseas Pakistanis & Human Resource Development, presum-
ably due to the state’s desire to view national economic develop-
ment more holistically. A paper on Pakistani diaspora policy was
completed in 2013 and approved by the prime minister, though
has not been put forward in Parliament. Pakistani diaspora engage-
ment policies should be seen in this context, which is fragmented
despite conscious efforts of diaspora building - seeking to expand
and strengthen ties among a potential pool of people to engage -
and diaspora integration - seeking to strengthen existing ties with
co-ethnics across borders (Gamlen, 2008).
Pakistan has dual citizenship agreements with 16 countries. A
National Identity Card for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP) is offered
Pakistani citizens working abroad and dual nationality holders.
The Pakistan Origin Card (POC) is offered to persons of Pakistani
origin, who are not Pakistani citizens (at present), but whose par-
ents or grandparents were. The NICOP grants wider rights, to over-
seas Pakistani citizens, whereas the POC grants more limited rights
to overseas Pakistanis who are non-citizens.4 However, in both
cases, visa-free travel to Pakistan, indefinite stay, investments, such
as purchasing land or property in Pakistan, and holding a Pakistani
bank account, are permitted. The NICOP guarantees holders the same
basic rights as any Pakistani citizen, despite not being a resident,
with the exception of the right to vote, if holding dual nationality.
The NICOP and the POC thus contributes to individuals’ mobility
resources and to some economic rights, but limited political rights.
Extraterritorial voting and the possibility to run for election for Pak-
istanis abroad have fueled heated debate and these rights so far
remain exclusive to those holding Pakistani citizenship.5 The right
to vote from abroad was only granted in 2012, and excludes overseas
Pakistanis with dual citizenship from voting. Estimates suggest that
about 3.7 million of the 7–9 million people in the global Pakistani
diaspora hold only Pakistani citizenship.
Pakistani authorities are overall very keen on engaging the dias-
pora. They see the extension of extraterritorial voting as part of a
wider strategy, which includes attracting remittances. The Election
Committee of Pakistan is reportedly considering provisions along
these lines for the 2018 national elections.
‘The proposed criterion for candidates [from the diaspora to run
for election] was a minimum stay of three years abroad and
remittances of at least $50,000. Those possessing dual national-4 On the difference between the NICOP and the POC: http://www.pakconsulatela.
org/?page_id=1492.
5 http://www.dawn.com/news/1201344/ecp-says-it-stands-by-its-plan-to-give-
overseas-pakistanis-right-to-vote.ity would have to surrender their foreign nationality to qualify
as a voter.’6
The linking of election rights with financial contributions may
be understood in a neoliberal, capitalist logic. Yet, it is just as per-
tinent to cast the Pakistani case within the framework of an aspir-
ing developmentalist state matching its ambitions to collect and
redistribute Islamic alms to the poor through the institution of
Bait-Ul-Mal.7
Remittances to Pakistan have consistently grown, year after
year and throughout the financial crisis of the late 2000s. They
reached 18.4 billion US dollars in the fiscal year ending June
2015.8 According to the World Bank, remittances in 2013 accounted
for approximately 6% of Pakistan’s GDP. The Pakistan Remittance Ini-
tiative (hereafter: PRI) is a joint effort of the State Bank of Pakistan,
the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis & Human Resource Development
and the Ministry of Finance. It was established in 2009, with the
objective of attracting more remittances and doing so through the
formal banking system by offering better remitting services. So far,
the PRI has contributed to making bank remittance transfers to Pak-
istan more transparent and efficient. Its profile is of an organization
focused on customer relations, offering a 24/7 helpline for senders
and receivers of remittances. The continued growth of remittances
to Pakistan since the PRI was established cannot be accounted for
by its very existence, though the related public attention to remit-
tances and their transfer may have played some role.
In the draft National Policy for Overseas Pakistanis, the
Government of Pakistan (2013) presented the state’s aims to use
diaspora resources in Pakistan’s national development. The policy
paper recommends that the diaspora population be referred to as
non-resident Pakistanis, evocative of non-resident Indians (NRI),
a group which Indian authorities have been targeting for invest-
ments and development engagements for a long period of time.
It suggests further political rights for persons with dual citizenship,
greater concern for returnees’ experiences, focus on the role of con-
sular services abroad in maintaining the goodwill of the diaspora,
sustaining ties to Pakistan through cultural activities abroad and
continued focus on remittances and investments in Pakistan.
Throughout the policy paper, the diaspora population is discussed
within the national Pakistani framework, for example, being
referred to as ‘nationals at home and abroad’ (Government of
Pakistan, 2013, p. 2). This echoes what Collyer (2013) identifies
as the state’s changing perceptions of peoplehood. The policy paper
thus enacts a particular ideology of nationhood while displaying
overlapping and disconnected conceptions of citizenship, where
membership is defined by combinations of language, territory,6 http://www.dawn.com/news/1201344/ecp-says-it-stands-by-its-plan-to-give-
overseas-pakistanis-right-to-vote.
7 http://www.pbm.gov.pk/pbm.html.
8 http://www.tribune.com.pk/story/920286/pakistan-pockets-remittances-
amounting-to-18-4b/.
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Through this it lays the ground for what Raj (2015) refers to as ‘em-
igrant infrastructures’ which co-produce diasporic subjectivities.
Totaling 38,000, migrants from Pakistan and their descendants
are one of the larger non-European groups in Norway, even if
numerically small in global scale. This group is part of a population
of labor migrants whose immigration to Norway started in the
1970s and continued into the following decades through chain
migration and family reunification; starting a couple decades ear-
lier, a similar pattern occurred in the UK and a parallel pattern
developed in Denmark (Bolognani, 2007; Rytter, 2010; Shaw,
2000). Norway does not permit dual citizenship (exceptions do
not include Pakistanis), and 77% of Norwegian-Pakistanis hold Nor-
wegian citizenship (and thus not Pakistani citizenship) (Pettersen,
2012). Among non-European migrants in Norway, overall, the
trend is to naturalize. This contrasts with the habit of many Euro-
pean and American migrants. It is associated with the mobility
resources and visa-free travel that a Norwegian passport grants
(Pettersen, 2012). Naturalization among non-European migrants
in Norway is closely tied to global inequalities in mobility
resources. The denunciation of a previous citizenship is more often
assumed to be a pragmatic decision rather than related to any
essentialist notions of belonging and a peoplehood. Conceptions
of citizenship are thus flexible, and are flexibilized through prag-
matic strategies, which in turn, translate into sometimes overlap-
ping and other times disconnected ideologies of nationhood.
The next section analyzes migrants’ transnational citizenship
practices as responses to the state’s diaspora policy. They are oper-
ationalized in the form of the Pakistani Origin Card, remittances
and return mobilities. All three forms give rise to conceptual and
normative debates about membership, territory and citizenship
within modern nation-states, thus shedding light on the processual
and negotiated categories of nationhood and peoplehood.5. Migrants’ transnational citizenship practices as responses to
diaspora policies
5.1. The Pakistan Origin Card
Mobility and political rights are usually associated with citizen-
ship, in the formal sense. Plenty of attention is paid to political
rights, such as voting and running for election, but less to mobility
resources (Carling, 2008). For many migrants from poorer coun-
tries, however, mobility may be the primary reason for choosing
to naturalize and gain a particular countries’ formal citizenship.
When dual citizenship is not an option, such as in Norway, most
migrants from outside Europe and North America choose Norwe-
gian citizenship, because this affords them mobility resources they
are reliant upon in order to sustain transnational ties (Pettersen,
2012). They choose the citizenship of the immigration state pre-
cisely because it affords them mobility, which illustrates how
mobility resources are at the heart of considerations about formal
citizenship. They may be more pressing than political, social and
economic rights, which in Europe are largely extended to resident
non-citizens. Mobility may also even be higher on the considera-
tions hierarchy than membership or belonging, neither of which
need be perceived as contingent on formal citizenship (Mavroudi,
2008), and is reflective of pragmatic and flexible stances to citizen-
ship as formal status.
So how do Norwegian-Pakistanis relate to the Pakistani Origin
Card (hereafter: POC)? What functions does the card serve? Does
the POC provide emotional ties to Pakistan, affirming membership
in terms of peoplehood? In interviews, Pakistani migrants and
their descendants reflected on reasons to hold the POC and not
to. Key reasons to hold were: (1) it made travel easier and cheaper,as the NICOP grants visa-free travel to Pakistan; (2) it was a prac-
tical help, enabling investment in property in Pakistan and facili-
tating paperwork; and (3) it was necessary to secure inheritances
and organize family matters (e.g. funerals, family businesses). Gen-
dered dimensions of care work in transnational families were also
often relevant (Ho et al., 2015a). Those who did not hold the POC
said it was either because they travelled infrequently and therefore
saw no need for visa-free expediency or because they felt getting
the POC was too much of a hassle. The card’s issuance requires
completion of a form in Urdu, listing the ID numbers of the appli-
cant’s parents and other potentially linguistically or bureaucrati-
cally trying tasks. Interviewees did not assume that the POC
automatically conferred identity or belonging. The card applica-
tion’s Urdu-only form, however, sends a signal that could be inter-
preted as the articulation of peoplehood in linguistic terms – an
ideology of nationhood placing language at its core. At the Pak-
istani state’s inception, the choice of Urdu as the national language
was not based on what the majority spoke; it was a conscious
strategy of nation-building in a postcolonial context where a lin-
guistically plural society had to be governed.
Norwegian-Pakistani migrants, however, have no real choice. If
they want to be able to travel relatively freely around the world,
they need a Norwegian passport. The fact that they then have to
renounce their Pakistani citizenship may affect how they consider
the passport as a document and relate to citizenship as a concept.
This is a matter of pragmatism and flexibility, where transnational
citizenship practices are enacted with formal, quasi-formal or
informal status (Bauböck, 2010). Such approaches to citizenship
highlight the potential for citizenship constituting a form of capi-
tal, in this context in particular of mobility. This further under-
scores the continuing significance of the passport itself, as a
symbol of formal citizenship, which remains important to migrants
who experience territorially bounded nation-states, and their bor-
der controls, as key challenges to leading transnationally mobile
lives (Torpey, 2000).
Migrants’ attitudes toward passports could be explained in
terms of general pragmatism: they are simply a means for mobil-
ity. However, another explanation could stem from migrants’ per-
spectives on the Pakistani state and its institutions, which are
riddled with distrust; reflecting a perception to those living in Pak-
istan itself (Lall, 2012). This distrust has clear implications for how
the Pakistani state can enact citizenship and nationhood vis-à-vis
the overall population and its diaspora. Migrants’ pragmatism
toward the Pakistani state and their functional view of the POC
(much like of Norwegian citizenship) highlights mobility and
mobility rights as an important dimension in conceptualizing citi-
zenship (Bauder, 2013a; Spinney et al., 2015). Among academics
and policymakers placed in the Global North, access to mobility
resources may be taken for granted, and its significance about
acquiring such resources can be underestimated in discussions
about citizenship.
Belonging, identity and nationhood seem simultaneously con-
nected and disconnected to citizenship. This becomes apparent
when drawing on a territorialized conception of citizenship, where
pragmatism and flelxibilization emerge from the state and from its
targeted diaspora members. Juxtaposing the POC as a diaspora
engagement measure with reflections among Norwegian-
Pakistani migrants and their descendants, it would seem that the
POC is a great asset to those seeking to engage more with Pakistan.
Yet, for those not already engaged, the POC makes no difference.
The POC is an interesting construct revealing how Pakistan, as an
emigration state, relates to its population abroad. Moreover, it
sheds light on citizenship vis-à-vis membership, being something
that is formalized, semi-formalized or non-formalized. The option
of alternative identity papers, such as the POC, granting selective
rights, akin to citizens’ rights, is actively pursued, with mobility
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then becomes a quasi-citizenship status, formally affirming mem-
bership and granting particular territorial and citizenship-related
rights, while withholding other, mainly political rights. A measure
connected to citizenship, the POC is ostensibly being offered with
the ambition of increasing investments and remittances; affirming
membership and actively including the diaspora in notions of peo-
plehood that serve financial and developmental purposes.
The POC highlights how membership is a matter of definition.
Here the absolute boundaries of territory can actually be negoti-
ated. Formal citizenship is also negotiated and new forms of
quasi-citizenship are developed. The POC points to the salience
of mobility resources in discussions of diaspora policies and citi-
zenship, membership and the spatialities of transnational citizen-
ship(s). States’ and migrants’ perspectives may differ, and
migrants may make pragmatic choices that focus more on mobility
resources than other dimensions. At the same time, while the POC
may be perceived as a Pakistani state instrument applied for prag-
matic gain from the diaspora, the Urdu-only application form sig-
nals unequivocal membership prerequisites. Beyond citizenship
and territory, a particular linguistic heritage is expected. Thus,
overlapping and disconnected conceptions of citizenship and
nationhood emerge when state policy and intentions surrounding
the POC are juxtaposed with migrants’ and descendants’ transna-
tional citizenship practices.
5.2. Remittances
Economic investments and transfers through the formal bank-
ing system are key aims of many countries’ diaspora policies, as
the significance of remittances for particular countries’ GDPs
makes evident. A majority of Pakistani migrants send remittances
to family and extended kinship networks back home, and are likely
to do so again, whether regularly or on an ad hoc basis (Erdal,
2012). Economic engagements with the emigration country
through remittances may be private and individual, at the family
level or embedded in religious practice or humanitarian involve-
ment (Erdal and Borchgrevink, 2016), and are differentiated
between men and women, and across migrant generations. Remit-
tances may be more or less voluntary; however, they are not a
response to an obligation to the state, as is paying taxes.9 Usually,
states’ outreach for funds from diasporas are based on members
wanting to contribute voluntarily, through a sense of duty to their
emigration country, and usually their family. States may seek to
enhance diaspora attachments to the emigration country by organiz-
ing diaspora festivals, hosting study tours for diaspora youth, show-
ing symbolic appreciation of the diaspora or offering
institutionalized services (e.g. extraterritorial voting, consular ser-
vices and extending property rights).
However, there is an apparent mismatch in scales here, as
migrants’ remittances are primarily operating at individual and
family levels, whereas state’s remittance initiatives operate at
national and international levels, the PRI is an example par excel-
lence. Among Norwegian-Pakistanis, remittances are largely sent
between individuals, within or beyond households, and often
within families and broader kinship networks (Erdal, 2012). Never-
theless, the state’s role is also relevant, and remittance senders are
aware of this. Tayyab, a mid-40-year-old, small business owner in
Norway, relayed this when conveying his choice of transfer
mechanisms.
There are problems with the Pakistani system, corruption, it’s
slow, and everything, so you want to avoid all that. Some use
the banks, if you want to go into direct investments. . . if you9 Exceptions include taxes levied from diasporas; on Eritrea, see e.g. Koser, 2003.have money in the banks then there isn’t the same level of con-
fidentiality in the banking system in Pakistan as you have here
[in Norway] so maybe, in a village or small town, it will soon be
well known what you have in the bank.
Tayyab’s reflection on corruption in Pakistan, with a deep-
seated distrust in this state-operated system, was common. It
was particularly directed at the Pakistani state. While the PRI
was rarely cited by research participants, their reflections on
remittance-sending to Pakistan points to some of the very chal-
lenges the organization was set up to deal with, such as quality
and efficiency of remittance services in Pakistani banks. Remit-
tance senders and receivers raised serious reservations about plac-
ing trust in the banking system whatsoever. Efficient or not,
Pakistan’s state institutions were generally distrusted. Corruption
was one concern, but so was overall trustworthiness. Both issues
the PRI is not equipped to handle, though they undoubtedly have
implications for the Pakistani state’s broader diaspora engagement
ambitions. This reflects a disconnection between ideologies of
nationhood and conceptions of citizenship, where for many Pak-
istanis, nationhood less depends on the state, than citizenship poli-
cies might assume.
State distrust and frustration with corruption signal the dias-
pora’s disassociation from Pakistan. This, however, runs parallel
to a self-identification as Pakistani diaspora thus affirm their mem-
bership in one sense, while simultaneously opposing the institu-
tional aspects to the Pakistani state. However, their opposition
mainly translates into pragmatism and distancing, rather than
political activism for change. Notions of citizenship are primarily
challenged by distrust in the emigration state, plus the fact that
the diaspora hardly relies on it, therefore displaying scarce loyalty
to it. Membership gets articulated by physically affirming belong-
ing in particular local communities through economic investments
and, more abstractly, by continuing to see oneself as Pakistani.
Thus, shared ideologies of nationhood are confirmed, while citizen-
ship in a formal sense is pragmatically and flexibly taken or left.
That leaves the state with fewer tools with which to affect
migrants’ transnational citizenship practices.
The juxtaposition of migrants’ remittances with state diaspora
engagement policies reveals a scalar mismatch between private,
familial exchanges and national, macro-level economic needs.
Migrants’ strong senses of attachment, affirming membership,
attachment to territory and citizenship practices instead are illus-
trated. The bonds, however, are tempered by a distinct distrust in
the state system. The resulting pragmatism to a large extent
matches overall sentiments among people in Pakistan (Lall,
2012). With regards to remittances, there is a glaring disconnect
in conceptions of membership; migrants seek to disengage from
state involvement, for fear of corruption or delays. The scalar mis-
match concerning remittances also points to how membership
within and across territorial borders may unite citizens (and
non-citizens) in how they see themselves in the vertical state-
citizen relationship, in this case being marked by a high degree
of distrust and pragmatism. The overlap in conception of nation-
hood is as striking as is the disconnect, revealing the need to
approach these as negotiated and processual constellations that
are inherently plural (Bauböck, 2010).
5.3. Return mobilities
States may approach return mobilities with a desire for return,
reluctance to return or ambivalence, depending on economic and
political circumstances. Research on considerations about and
experiences with return mobilities reveals migrants’ often simulta-
neous attachments to their countries of emigration and immigra-
tion (De Bree et al., 2010). This is indicative of how mobility
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Law, 2013). Much like emigration, return migration is not final,
at least for migrants with adequate mobility resources (White,
2013), which is why I chose the term return mobilities. For the
majority of Pakistani labor migrants to the Gulf countries, mobility
is a highly managed phenomenon. However, for the global Pak-
istani diaspora, with longstanding transnational ties to Pakistan,
this differs entirely. The majority of them are privileged; they live
in the global North and have access to mobility resources granted
by their country of immigration through citizenship.10
Norwegian-Pakistani migrants’ considerations about, and expe-
riences of return mobilities, are closely intertwined with practical-
ities of everyday life in Pakistan, and as such relate to its state and
its diaspora engagement initiatives. My research among
Norwegian-Pakistanis shows that few migrants will return on a
permanent basis to Pakistan, though many consider spending
longer periods of time there while retaining permanent residence
in Norway (Erdal et al., 2015). This reveals how both citizenship
and residency is flexible. Among return migrants from Norway in
Pakistan, a common theme was the idea of return to Norway. This
is an interesting backdrop for juxtaposing Pakistani diaspora
strategies of return mobilities with migrants’ practices. The prac-
tices may be as return migrants, as prospective re-emigrants or
as a category of people living in a particular transnational social
field, where citizenship, membership and territory is defined in
relation to not only one state and one national community, but
to two or more. Here there might be multiple conceptions of citi-
zenship and ideologies of nationhood, which frame citizenship acts
as situated practices.
This was apparent in what Anjum, a 50-year-old woman who
spent eight years in Pakistan before re-migrating to Norway, told
me.11
I never wanted to move to Pakistan in the first place. I had to go
there to look after my mother-in-law, and my four children
moved there with me. We had so many problems finding the
right school and sorting out everything there. . . But then it
gradually worked fine. Still, I was waiting to move back to
Norway.
Juxtaposing Pakistani diaspora engagement policies, which
encourage and seek to facilitate return with migrants’ transna-
tional citizenship practices, in the form of everyday decision-
making about return mobilities, underscores two points: First,
many migrants experienced everyday inconveniences and hard-
ships while settling in Pakistan. Securing a good school for children
was often mentioned, but so were paperwork and bureaucracy,
prices of services and the inevitable corruption (see also Paasche,
2016). Second, returnees (from Europe, in particular) were a group
who often seem to lead transnational lives. They made use of their
citizenship and residency rights in countries other than Pakistan
and held a long-term perspective on mobility (Erdal et al., 2015).
This highlights the elusive nature of residency in practical and ter-
ritorial terms. Many of these returnees may be neither Pakistani
citizens nor residents in any permanent sense, yet were spending
significant amounts of time (and resources) in Pakistan.
Experiences and consideration of return mobilities underscore
similar perceptions of the state as was found in the previous anal-
ysis sections, exploring the POC and remittances: lacking trust in
state institutions and frustration with corruption. However, the
role of the Pakistani state is often (and at best) invisible in consid-
erations about and experiences of return mobilities. So, despite10 There are notable exceptions to this, with Pakistani migrants without regular
status, especially in Southern Europe. Their experiences and practices, however, are
not the focus of this article.
11 See also Erdal et al. (2015).active policies on embracing the diaspora – as nationals at home
and abroad – there are few actual experiences of this among those
considering return or those having returned for shorter or longer
periods to Pakistan. Pakistan as an emigration state is only to an
extent enacting citizenship in a way that is inclusive of the poten-
tial diaspora it wants to engage through return.
With regard to citizenship in the emigration context, return
mobilities experiences highlight the elusive nature of residency,
whereby territory – as a result of mobility – becomes more or less
significant, depending on available mobility resources (see Fig. 1).
Building on the elusiveness of residency, it may be argued further
that return mobilities accentuate the challenge the state faces in
negotiating the inclusion of permanent residents and others
within its peoplehood. Which ideologies of nationhood get
selected and how they map onto conceptions of citizenship
become important. A peoplehood inclusive of emigrants may be
something migrants are themselves willing to engage. It lets them
sustain membership over time and fulfill any possible nostalgic
inclinations, as they, as part of the people stay woven in the
fabric of the nation. However, non-migrants may be more
ambivalent, as indicated in heated debates about Pakistanis
abroad with dual citizenship being allowed to vote in Pakistan.12
Their ambivalence relates to economic inequalities and may be
seen as resistance to the attention the numerically small (and
wealthy) diaspora in the global North receives. More profoundly,
it also addresses ideologies of nationhood as negotiable (or not).
Pakistani English-language media tends to discuss citizenship in
essentialist terms. For instance, a report on the number of
Pakistanis who have renounced their Pakistani citizenship says
these individuals ‘want to give up their association with the
homeland’.13 Migrants’ and the state’s more pragmatic, flexible
approaches to citizenship (cf. Mavroudi, 2008), which are partly
disconnected from nationhood, may therefore not be in sync with
the sensibilities of most Pakistanis. The discrepancy can be seen
when the connection is drawn between holding Pakistani citizen-
ship and as questions of membership in the nation.
6. Conclusion
Juxtaposing diaspora engagement policies with transnational
citizenship practices reveals how states and migrants conceive in
different ways the relationships between citizenship, territory
and membership. It also uncovers varying ideologies of nation-
hood, which like conceptions of citizenship, are approached prag-
matically, with varying degrees of flexibility. There are, however,
clear overlaps and disconnects between the state’s approach and
migrants’ transnational citizenship practices, and how they con-
cern various segments of the Pakistani population.
Obtaining or not obtaining the POC, sending remittances and
practicing return are all choices that index concrete obstacles
related to distrust and corruption, both of which disrupt the poten-
tial for state-diaspora engagements in Pakistan. Comparing dias-
pora policy with migrants’ transnational citizenship practices, the
multi-scalar, formal, semi-formal and informal, nature of citizen-
ship as everyday practice becomes apparent (Staeheli et al.,
2012), highlighting the multiplicity of transnational lived citizen-
ship (Kallio and Mitchell, 2016; Ho et al., 2015b). How citizenship,
territory and membership are conceived of and interrelated in
sometimes contradictory ways causes friction. This is highlighted
by how the state and migrants invoke a quasi-citizenship status
via the POC, with an ensuing scalar mismatch pointing to the12 See e.g. http://www.dawn.com/news/1201344/ecp-says-it-stands-by-its-plan-to-
give-overseas-pakistanis-right-to-vote.
13 http://tribune.com.pk/story/866243/worrying-signs-3400-pakistanis-give-up-
nationality-in-five-years.
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remittances, and through the elusive nature of residence, exposed
by return mobilities (see also Erdal et al., 2015).
Pakistani migrants’ transnational citizenship practices identify
distrust and inadequate or poorly functioning state institutions
as stumbling blocks to furthering diaspora engagement in Pakistan.
This is the case in many other states with weak governance
(Collyer, 2013). Having experienced mistrust and corruption, many
migrants are pragmatic in responding to the state’s diaspora
engagement initiatives. Still, many Pakistanis abroad are highly
engaged with Pakistan, both personally – staying connected to
family, friends, village or neighborhood, but also at a collective
level evoking a sense of national identification and membership.
The lack of action beyond spheres associated with the personal is
often connected to distrust in the state and distrust in the system
of governance.
These challenges and their ensuing pragmatism liken the dias-
pora more to the Pakistani population at large, rather than distance
it in view of broader state distrust (Lall, 2012). Trust is key for
building stories of peoplehood (Smith, 2003), not only in diasporas,
but generally within nation-states. Still for non-resident and often
non-citizen diaspora members, the state’s outreach requires no
response; the diaspora can choose to not engage, thus distinguish-
ing them from the archetypal citizen. This raises questions about
how membership among the people is understood and the specific
relevance of particular spatialities, for instance when there are few
situated practices of transnational lived citizenship, which thus
only to a limited extent, as acts, frame transnational citizenship
(s) (Staeheli, 2011; Staeheli et al., 2012; Kallio and Mitchell,
2016). In several ways, the diaspora seems to appreciate the efforts
by the Pakistani state, for example, the POC as an option to avoid
visa hassle and fees. Meanwhile, many diaspora members call
themselves Pakistani despite what the state might do, suggesting
that membership in terms of ‘peoplehood’ goes beyond citizenship
or residency – and that defining nationhood is not (entirely) up to
the state.
What implications, then, arise when conceptualizing citizenship
and ideologies of nationhood from an emigration state’s outlook?
The notion of peoplehood as articulated by Collyer (2013) allows
for the encompassing of all categories of individuals that the state
relates to beyond its territorial borders (see also Fig. 1). As Gamlen
(2014) notes, states diaspora strategies may be seen as tapping the
diaspora for resources (e.g. remittances) and embracing the dias-
pora as part of the nation (assuming that enables tapping later).
Another perspective appears, however, when the policy level is
juxtaposed both with migrants’ situated transnational citizenship
practices and with non-migrants’ experiences and reflections. As
for embracing, the state holds some formal power, it grants citizen-
ship and other permissions (Martin and Paasi, 2016; Torpey, 2000).
However, the state still depends on the people to uphold the col-
lective identities of peoplehood as a nation from within and out-
side its territories, reflective of the relational, processual and
dynamic nature of citizenship as horizontal and vertical ties.
Being included in the people signals membership within the
community, where exclusion is no likelier than for any other mem-
ber of that community, regardless of residency. Yet, in the Pakistani
case, as has been shown, while the state’s ideology of nationhood
may promote inclusion and full membership, in interpersonal
exchanges and practical everyday encounters, diaspora Pakistanis
are not seen as equal members – at least not by resident Pak-
istani’s. This calls into question the extent to which a state’s
embracing of the diaspora is actually something the state holds
the powers to enact. It indicates, moreover, the need for continued
dialogue between studies that focus on state institutions and those
that look into migrant practices, both in relation to studies of dias-
pora strategies and of transnational lived citizenship. It also begsfor the inclusion of non-migrant populations’ perspectives and
subjectivities (Ho et al., 2015b). However, in the Pakistani case,
migrants’ and non-migrants’ shared experiences of corruption,
which contribute to distrust in the state, create, perhaps counter-
intuitively, a common battle to join forces over, across the
migrant/non-migrant divide (Lall, 2012).
Considering the case of Pakistani diaspora policy and
Norwegian-Pakistanis transnational citizenship practices, it may
be argued that the term non-resident citizen is not particularly
helpful for describing the group of people whom the state is target-
ing. By and large, they are non-resident non-citizens and, increas-
ingly, have never been citizens (migrants’ descendants).
Meanwhile, many draw on conceptions of other-than-formal citi-
zenship, associated with family ties and connections with particu-
lar places. As such, diaspora-Pakistanis are negotiating ideologies
of nationhood over time and over their life courses, in relation to
the Pakistani state, but also in relation to local communities in Pak-
istan. Thus, neither conceptions of citizenship, nor ideologies of
nationhood, remain static. Rather, they are pragmatically, flexibly,
produced through transnational citizenship practices.
Shifting the perspective to countries of immigration; migrants
may officially be welcomed as part of the people in their countries
of immigration, following naturalization and citizenship acquisi-
tion. However, in everyday life, this may be quite different, with
concerns echoing the ambivalence of transnational living, found
in emigration contexts: of always not being here or there, being
almost a member, and almost having full citizenship (Ho, 2011;
Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2006; Smith, 2003). Migrants may experi-
ence this feeling of liminality as citizens and residents, here and
there.
As a result of transnational mobilities and ties, and the elusive-
ness of residency, a state’s nationhood ideologies must be in sync
not only with us here (e.g. in Pakistan) and us there (e.g. in the
diaspora), but also with us as transnationally mobile and present
both here and there. A focus on spatialities, foregrounding the par-
ticular politico-spatial contexts which frame situated practices of
engaging in transnational lived citizenship, becomes important
for understanding the interplay between the state’s nationhood
ideologies, and the perspectives of different segments of the
people.
States redefine boundaries of belonging– in connection with
changing notions of peoplehood. People’s responses are spatially
situated, and tied to the (nation-)states where they are citizens
or residents. The interplay of actors is crucial, foregrounding that
citizenship, nationhood and residence should not be understood
in static terms. Drawing on the juxtaposition of Pakistani diaspora
policies and migrants’ transnational citizenship practices, the
negotiation of citizenship(s) and nationhood(s) is produced across
co-constitutive scales. These are produced in relation to the state,
rather than by the state, and involve overlaps, friction, and disrup-
tions, in how emerging stories of peoplehood are articulated, justi-
fied and enacted.
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